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IV—THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL BUTLER.
BY EOBERT F. EATTKAT.
INTRODUCTION.
IT is only right to say that the essential and significant dis-
coveries and arguments in this philosophy were published
some seven years before Butler's Life and Habit, namely in
1870, by the famous physiologist and psychologist, Prof.
Ewald Hering, in his Presidential Address before the Im-
perial Academy of Sciences at Vienna,1 so the theory on
which this philosophy is based is rightly called the Hering-
Butler theory. But Hering did not pursue this line, and it
was quite independently that Butler made the discoveries
and arguments and followed them out, and then supported
them from the scientists themselves, and with argument, in
book after book. He acknowledged Hering to the full, im-
mediately after having discovered him and thereafter.
The philosophy of Samuel Butler as such has been and is
gaming ground in significant fashion. Prof. Freud of Vienna
has published psychological doctrines strikingly similar to the
Henng-Butler theories—not to speak of the similarity of the
views of Prof. Bergson and others: * and the widespread
attention these have recently aroused may rightly swell the
interest in our sadly neglected Samuel Butler. Mendelism
is a witness to such resurrections. So a resume and ex-
position of Butler's philosophy may be welcome.
Butler is more immediately concerned with the philosophy
of nature, in a special sense—specifically, with evolution.
He is a vitalist, thorough-going. A summary of his views
on evolution, written by himself, is to be found in Essays on
Life, Art and Science, in the essay entitled " The Deadlock in
Darwinism ". This essay contains his reply to Weismann :
the article being a reprint from the Universal Review, 1890.
The chief book by Butler devoted to evolution is Life and
Eabvt (1877). This contains the gist of Butlei's whole doc-
1
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372 ROBERT F. RATTRAT:
trine. He published several other books reviving and main-
taining Buffon, Dr. Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck against
Charles Darwin. Let no one think that Butler was not
well read in his subject—time has already told strikingly in
his favour and against his opponents. For Butler's position
in the world of science, see the Introduction to Unconscious
Memory (one of Butler's books),1 1910 ed. by Prof. Marcus
Hartog, where the imposing list of ' Butlerians' will be found,
and that has been added to since 1910.
In expounding Butler I will stick to Butler's own words
so far as I can in loyalty to my task and my interpretation.
It is no easy matter, I have found, to epitomise Butler from
his books. One is forced to use his own words largely, for
one feels that they fit with the cleanness won in the struggle
for existence by the fittest survivors. Nevertheless, one
must fit in the various parts in a unity of presentation,
which was not Butler's task, and improve here and there
the manner of presentation for our purpose. The difficulties
of my task are now, perhaps, evident. The following is the
result of my endeavour:—
EXPOSITION OV BUTLER'S PHILOSOPHY.
Anatole France has pointed out that if the Universe were
the size of a nut, everything being in proportion, no one
would know the difference. In fact, things have no size
except in relation to each other. There is no Buch thing as
size in the absolute sense. Shakespeare was indeed right
when he made Hamlet say (and it may have been this that
suggested the simile to Anatole France): " I could be happy
in a nutshell," and when he made him say the similar thing,
" Denmark's a prison ". The microscope makes the Universe
larger. The Universe is indeed a fairy world, expanding
according as you look.
' The fallacy of size '—namely, the belief that size ia abso-
lute—is one of the greatest obstacles to our understanding
the Universe Space is infinite in the atom as well as in the
Universe. It is simply in-finite.
Now what we have just sought to do with space or size,
Butler's philosophy seeks to do with consciousness—to show
that it extends infinite in area throughout the Universe even
in the apparently smallest things. If a thing is very, very
small, we find it hard to believe that it can be very complex,
forgetting that it is only small relative to us, and if we should
hooka
Needless to uay, this essay is not uri adequate substitute for Butler's
>ks.
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL BUTLER. 373
get sufficient evidence that it is very complex, we ought to
believe that it is so, even though we cannot see the intricacy
of its structure: it may have an intricacy which is not visible
to us. Now science produces such evidence. Butler produces
such evidence of a special kind. As a result of his philosophy,
he finds God working through human agents, as it were,
where mechanism is generally thought to rule. He finds an
inside to the Universe, which is one and continuous with the
' inside' in us. He is thus a pantheist, in a sense. But he
makes all this probable to our minds by logically connected
chains of reasoning in touch with facts constantly. It justi-
fies most startling old philosophy which we would like to
believe in, but which we have not dared to believe in really,
before; it justifies religion by this logical and factual argu-
ment.
The argument will be a long and close one, but the reward
13 worth following it.
First of all, Butler draws special attention to the fact that
we are ' unconscious ' of vast quantities of actions, psychical
as well as physical, which we habitually perform. Such
actions are dependent on series learnt by memory—or ' learnt
by heart,' as we say. To repeat an action unconsciously, the
series must be gone through, memory being dependent on
' environment' to bring out the series. Such series, however,
are epitomised greatly. These ' unconscious' series can be-
come conscious more or less, in the case of disturbance of
the environment which is requisite to the ' unconsciousness '
of the series.
There is a general law of consciousness as follows : Every
thing, before we know it, we are unconscious of; then we
become conscious of it, and as we grow to know it better we
become more and more conscious of it until a point is reached
beyond which familiarity makes us less and less consciously atten-
tive or attentively conscious of it (unless this process is stayed
for a time by effort of will). " Extremes meet" in " un-
consciousness". When our acquaintance with a thing is so
familiar that we are 'unconscious' of it we know it 'in our
sleep and blindfold'. But we remember it, demonstrably.
We thus remember more than we remember remembering.
But we remember best, in the sense of consciously remember-
ing, things that we do not know so well as we know these
things.
' Unconsciousness' covers high products as well as low.
It covers old habits in our experience and also ancient
' biological' habits—the functions of our bodies which are
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374 BOBBBT P. EATTBAT:
' instinctive'—the upright position, for example, swallowing,
breathing, the circulation of the blood, largely. Butler raises
the question, May all be due to habits at one time or other
consciously acquired ? He asks us to notice the three fol-
lowing facts:—
I. That we are most conscious of, and have most control
over, such habits as speech, the upright position, the arts
and sciences—which are acquisitions peculiar to the human
race, always acquired after birth, and not common to our-
selves and any ancestor who had not become entirely human.
IL That we are less conscious of, and have less control
over, eating and drinking, swallowing, breathing, seeing and
hearing—which were acquisitions of our prehuman ancestry,
and for which we had provided ourselves with all the neces-
sary apparatus before human history began, but which are,
biologically speaking, recent.
UL That we are most unconscious of, and have least con-
trol over, our digestion and circulation—powers possessed
even by onr invertebrate ancestry and, even biologically
speaking, of extreme antiquity.
Let it be noted, too, that disturbance or departure, to any
serious extent, from normal practice tends to induce resump-
tion of consciousness, even in the case of such old habits as
breathing, seeing, hearing, digestion, and circulation of the
blood.
Now it is an axiom as regards actions acquired after birth
that we never do them automatically save as the result of
long practice.
Breathing is an action acquired after birth. It is acquired
generally with some little hesitation and difficulty, but in a
time seldom longer, as we are informed, than ten minutes or
a quarter of an hour. There would seem to be a dispropor-
tion here between, on the one hand, the extreme intricacy
of the process and, on the other, the shortness of the time
taken to acquire the practice, the ease and unconsciousness
with which its exercise is continued from the moment of
acquisition. It looks like the repetition of a performance by
one who has done it very often before, but who requires just
a little prompting to set him off, on getting which the whole
familiar routine presents itself before him and he repeats
his task by rote.
Is it so with a baby ? Let us see.
Butler's argument is that the baby did learn to breathe—
.'out in the bodies of its remote ancestral antecedents, that
the baby is one and the same person as each and all of its
ancestors, through whom this continuous personality has
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL BUTLER. 375
gone, in the same sense as the man of eighty is the same
person as the embryo out of which he grew the man of
eighty, science tells us, has passed through several bodies
in his life-time, from cell to cell—and this person has
been repeating the performance of learning to breathe
whenever he finds himself at the stage in the evolutionary
process where ' learning to breathe' is called for, but the
age-long repetition has facilitated the process enormously:
indeed it is repeated in epitome merely. So the ' Law of
Recapitulation ' tells us that every human embryo has gills
for a time, a tail for a time, and hair on its face for a time—
going through in epitome the history' of its evolution as an
animal roughly. (Roughly, we say, because sequence may
be altered and then become regular in its altered form.)
Habit becomes unconscious. Is it not true that the older
and more confirmed the habit, the more unquestioning the
act of volition until, in the case of the oldest habits, the prac-
tice has so formulated the procedure that on being once
committed to such and such a line beyond a certain point—
the polyhedron, to use Prof. James's simile, heels over to
another face—or phase—and with ever quicker certainty,
until it eludes observation altogether ? Life goes in curves
of attention, which correspond to curves of consciousness, of
memory (consciousness is memory of things present, so to
speak, memory is consciousness of things past). As the
phenomena are repeated through memory they are epitomised.
Hence the more recent bulk the more largely in ' the outer
man'. The Law of Eecapitulation applies to the whole of con-
sciousness, of memory, because the amount of attention, is
limited. The curves are cumulative in this way. Apparent
simplicity or smallness may cover intricacy—it depends on
the number of graph-waves, so to speak, represented under
the larger graph-waves ; as in the nervous system, the ability
of the nervous system goes in proportion to the convolutions.
The Law of Recapitulation extends beyond the womb,
says Butler. Reproduction implies beginning at the be-
ginning and going rapidly through the whole evolutionary
process up to the point where, Anaximander acutely saw,
a method of reproduction was evolved which made child
dependent on parent. This corresponds roughly to the be-
ginning of the human stage in evolution. We recognise
birth as the beginning of consciousness roughly, but this is
arbitrary and is really based on the fact that the born babe
troubles society in propria persona, but the unborn does not.
Infancy is as the dozing of one who turns in his bed on
waking, and takes another short sleep before he rises. ' Con-
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376 ' ROBERT F. EATT1
sciousness' begins with the stretch of evolution with which
the ' embryo' is least familiar—in the case of man, roughly
at the ' human' stage. The successive environments set
going the psychological process which issues in actions. The
Law of Recapitulation is due to ancestral memories, accord-
ing to Butler.
Suppose a musician is playing and stumbles on to playing
a piece which he cannot identify. Later he is at a stack of
his music and comes across the score of the piece, and finds
that he must have learnt it early in his career as a musician
but had forgotten. This is an analogy for Butler's argn-
ment—the Law of Recapitulation being the musical score.
The fact that we cannot remember behind the time when
we were two years of age, say, does not make us believe that
we did not exist before then, or that we could not feel pain
before then, or express pleasure, or, in short, that we were
not conscious in some way. What we remember really
comes out only like the proof of the pudding in the actual
realisation of it. ' Which sock do you put on first in the
morning? '—this problem reveals to us the fact that we must
go through the performance in order to find out what we
do do: and this is clearly a case of memory, in our sense,
become subconscious.
Ancestral memories are almost accepted now—not merely
through literary men like R. L. Stevenson, but by psycholo-
gists like President Stanley Hall and Prof. Freud. "The
childhood of the race" is recognised as more than a mere
metaphor. The juvenile delight in games and stories of ad-
venture, etc., points back to " the childhood of the race".
The way in which we grow our bodies is, according to Butler,
due to inherited memories of the very ancient kind. On this
line, puberty and wisdom teeth, for example, receive explana-
tion, and what other explanation of these phenomena is to
be had •* The only alternative to Butler's view is Mechanism
—as Descartes saw and had the courage to state boldly his
alternative—and to reply " mechanism " to this question is
to think of the gramophone and forget the infinitely more
wonderful gramophone of the mind, which was prior to it.1
Our body and mind are but tools indeed, as Butler was never
tired of pointing out, but they are more controlled of the
spirit than tools are—the spirit of life is not a product of
mechanism, but mechanism is a product of life.
But are these memories real vicmc»tes ' Are they connected
Kutler has him.seIf given the best argument for Mechanism, nnrt thus
nsed it, in ErttiluUHt.
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL BUTLER. 377
with consciousness?1 Apparent unconsciousness in any
creature, no matter how small, is no proof of the absence
of stored-up, high-water-mark consciousness of the kind dealt
with above as against the actions such a creature may exhibit
which are inexplicable on any other ground. SmalJness is
purely relative, and the fact that a thing does not behave
exactl; as we behave is far from proving that it does not
behave. Moreover the lex oontinui forbids us to deny con-
tinuity of amsowusness between any human being and all its
previous stages in evolution whatsoever. We are conscious,
and we cannot fix a real, definite time at which we became
conscious, and it is a logical impossibility to derive con-
sciousness from that which is absolutely unconscious. The
threshold of consciousness is purely elusive in time as well
as in space. And what is true of an hour or two after birth
is true of an hour after birth, and so to an hour before birth,
and so on, back and back.
How is this continuity of personality throughout time
possible V Darwin's doctrine of pangenesis meets the case
on the physical side, and Wundt's law of 1896 we may apply
to this and say roundly that every physical process has a cor-
responding psychical process. ' Anthropocentricity ' is the
viee as much of the scientists as of the idealists, only with
the former it is centnfugaL The fact that a thing does not '
behave exactly as we do does not prove that it does not
behave. It is interesting to inquire why we admit animals
to varying degrees of consciousness in our thought about
them. One is almost ashamed to find that we only credit
them with having the conscious psychological processes which
we ourselves find very easy to follow, or perhaps rather,
which we find it absolutely impossible to avoid following, as
recognising too great a. family resemblance between them
and those which are most easily followed in our own minds
to be able to sit down in comfort under a denial of the resem-
blance. Thus, for example, if we see a chicken run away
from a fox, we do admit that the chicken knows the fox
would kill it if it caught it. But how about certain other
animals V Let us take a baby for example. The fact that it
does not behave exactly as we do does not prove that it does
not behave. The fact is that the baby has gone to bleep, or
ail-but gone to sleep, on the already infinite repetitions ol the
Law of Jtiecapitulation, in its wider sense. It grows ' in its
sleep and blindfold '. We are probably never so busy as
when we are babies before the age of two years, say, learu-
* Thin is the question at issue between Butler and Seniuu. See the
tatter's Die Alneme.
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378 BOBBBT P. BATTRAT:
ing to do the things we now do constantly. So a hen's egg
is the chicken in some sense—probably, again, at its highest
activity—making flesh, bones, feathers with nothing but a
little warmth and the white of an egg to make them from.
Even a stone, Bcience tells us, so far from being inert, is
really a limit of motion, ita particles darting hither and
thither with inconceivable rapidity.
' The fallacy of size' as we have pointed out above is one
of the greatest obstacles to our understanding the Universe.
If a gigantic man were looking down on the earth, how
should it appear to him ? With the help of a microscope,
and the intelligent exercise of his reason, he would, let us
hope, ultimately conceive the truth. But he would at first
put Covent Garden Market on the field of his microscope
and write about the unerring "instinct" which led each
costermonger to recognise his own basket or his own cart.
The fact that the amount of matter passed on from parents
to offspring is very small—this fact is no bar to our believing
that it can transmit memories of high complexities in epit-
ome. Recent theories of matter have familiarised us with
the fact that we must escape the fallacy of thinking that
small things are absolutely small and we must regard matter
as very complex in structure, capable of very complex
organisation, although the piece of matter may be very,
very small indeed.1 Thus the smallness of a baby or an
embryo, or even of ovum and spermatozoon is no bar to its
being alive and working.
On the other hand, the fact that spermatozoon, ovum,
embryo, baby are small is an explanation, in Butler's view, of
the fact that we do not ' remember' our previous lives in our
ancestors. In our present life we remember of our experi-
ence very little indeed—demonstrably. What wonder that
the details of our daily experience, which alone would give us
' memory' of a previous life, Bhould find no place in the
small epitome of them in ovum and spermatozoon, especially
as these two together strike a compromise between the ex-
periences they do remember, mostly. A memory inherited
•Hering's 'vibration theory' of the action of the nerves makes Butler's
and his own theory of ' memories' extremely plausible on physical
grounds—bee op. eit. and Butler's translation of it and comments in his
Unconscioit* Memory. For recent support of this vibration theory, see
The New Realism, essay by Prof. Holt, the psychologist of Harvard,
p. 322 itnd footnote, where older and distinguished support of such a
view is quoted. Prof. Holt seems unaware of Hering's Address referred
to, and I beg to disown the main thesis of Prof. Holt's essay and of the
New Realism. Hering's vibration theory may be extended to a theory
of matter of the highest usefulness, in my opinion.
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mast be deeply impressed in the organism if it endure
through the busy and difficult task of reproduction—a task
of extreme difficulty, let us remind ourselves, and probably
more difficult, in the depths of subconsciousness, than we
can possibly imagine. What wonder, again, that in general
the details of our lives in our ancestors should not come up
into ' consciousness' in our own lives, crowded as they are
with taeir own experiences. At most only stray memories
of this kind can so arise.
We demonstrate, says Butler, in our earliest infancy and
later, that we have had experience of ' this kind of thing'—
i.e. in growing our bodies, etc.,—before This experience,
which we must clearly have gained somewhere, was gained
by us in the persons of our forefathers. We actually have
been these ancestors. This continuity of action ia parents
and offspring throughout biology includes not only breathing,
of course, but the circulation of our blood and the multi-
tudinous other things too numerous to mention. Butler's
thesis is that the apparently mechanical,' instinctive' actions
of ours were each and all at one time ' consciously ' acquired
in the persons of our ancestral predecessors, and have, through
infinite repetition, become ' unconscious'.
How large a part of life may be ' unconsciously conscious'
in this sense staggers conception. Science, for example,
demands that we should imagine—to take an instance quoted
by Butler from Sir John Herschel—that the colour red
requires, to be perceived, that our eyes be affected four
hundred and eighty-two millions of millions of times—yellow
and violet, much larger numbers. And it is of course the
difference in frequency of the vibrations which affects us with
the diversity of colour. Vibrations, then, must in some
sense be ' unconsciously' counted by us, on this astounding
scale, too: but surely they mnst be counted in some sense
consciously. And all this must have been acquired in the
infinitely long ages behind us. " What is the disco'very
of the laws of gravitation as compared with the knowledge
which sleeps in every hen's egg upon a kitchen shelf? " asks
Butler modestly.
Such ideas may sound mad but they are true and have
very beneficent results, I believe. They end in giving us
the belief in a living and intelligent universe for belief in a
dead and fortuitous one. As Butler himself wrote of his
own doctrine—and no one was better qualified to see the
irony of it—" From the point of view of the law courts and
everyday life it is, of course, nonsense, but . . . common
decency in the palace of high philosophy where dwells
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380 HOBERT F. RATTRAY:
evolution. If we leave evolution alone, we may stick to
common practice and the law courts: touch evolution and
we are in another world; not higher, not lower, but different
as harmony from counterpoint." But still in the most
absolute counterpoint there is harmony, and in the most
absolute harmony, counterpoint.
Hering writes: " Theories concerning the development of
individual consciousness which deny heredity or the power
of transmission and insist upon an entirely fresh start for
every human soul as though the infinite number of generations
that have gone before us might as well have never lived for
all the effect they have had upon ourselves—such theories
will contradict the facts of our daily experience at every
touch and turn ". One of the blights we have inherited is
the tabula rasa view of the mind, which is deeply ingrained
in our thought. If the mind is not a tabula rasa, there is
continued psychological indentity through the generations, or
words have lost their meaning.
Continuity of personality between parent and offspring is
indisputable, and yet it has been amazingly neglected. When
we inquire into the matter we find that we are baffled in
trying to delimit individuals in this relation—and how far
does this relation not extend? A hen is only an egg's way
of making other eggs,—but grandparent fowls may be
contemporary with their grandchildren eggs: they have
become eggs and fowls and remain themselves never the
less. So elusive a thing is personal identity ! We can feel
our own ancestors in ourselves: we know them and feel
them, so to speak, whether we know them or not. Eugenics
is doing one good service in drawing attention to the import-
ance of heredity, one-sidedly neglected in recent democratic
talk.
The newly-born babe is really a part of its mother, and
we can trace it back to ovum and spermatozoon. If we
should suppose memory to be passed on from the parents in
the elements constitutive of the impregnate ovum, we should
nevertheless remember that a memory-series is dependent
on environmental stimulus for its recall, and so the memory of
the elements of the impregnate ovum would be recalled by
their environment to the sequence of changes Bet agoing by
such environment, so that the memory of the newly-born
babe, for example, would revert, not to yesterday when it
was in the body of its parent, but to the last occasion on
which it was a newly-born babe and to previous such occasions
—so it takes to breathing, sucking, etc. As its ancestors
learned to breathe, etc., so does it, but their experience has
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL BUTLEB. 381
facilitated the process to such a degree that but little help is
needed. And so through the Law of Recapitulation in its
wider sense.
Now it is this creature, which was such and such ancestors,
which remembers such and such past experiences uncon-
sciously and repeats them now. It is one and the same
creature throughout all the ramifications of its ancestry and
descemlents, through continuity of personality,—in the same
sense, practically, as an old man is the same person as the
embryo out of which he developed—the ' latencies' are
there in the same sense. A result of this is, when we
consider biology, that we find it to be biologically true that
we are all ' bound together in the great bundle of life '—by
such ancestral memories as we have in common, and these,
it will surely have been seen, constitute the very stuff of
personality pro tanto. Suppose, to put it shortly, there was a
primordial cell. From it we are all descended : it differentiated
itself into the manifold life of the world—birds,, fishes, and
animals in general. From the primordial cell to the place
where, as animals, we branched off, we have memories in
common. But moreover the primordial cell was all we all
of us had to start with, and things which were identical
with the same thing were identical with tme another.
Butler at first only extended his generalisations to the
organic world, but later he found that the " inorganic"
world could not be separated from the organic. He came
to see that every atom in the Universe must be regarded, in
some sense, as living, and able to feel and remember—in
however humble a way. Thus we should speak rather of
' the primordial atom' and include in our sweep ultimately
the whole Universe. In this case, every thing and every
body is the primordial atom of millions of years ago, in the
sense above defined: this can be denied only on grounds
which would deny that a thing is the thing it was yesterday.
The primordial cell has, so to speak, lived itself into suc-
ceeding generations of animals—generations of very complex
kinds : species blend and have blended into one another—
whole genera have become extinct, but the changes have
always been ' evolution,' i.e. more or less gradual.
In each generation the primordial cell in its myriad de-
scendent impregnate ova passes rapidly and ' unconsciously'
through all the earlier stages of evolution, of which there has
been infinite experience, but when it comes to the part of the
course which is not so clear, it becomes ' conscious ' : still,
however, where the course is plain, retaining ' unconscious-
ness,' as in breathing, digesting, etc. The primordial cell
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may thus be said to ' live itself'—not as we live out our
lives, as we think, living and living and living till we die—
but living by pulsations, so to speak, which are the genera-
tions of animals ; it lives so far in each animal and then goes
into a new body there and throws off the old. But this is
precisely what we do ourselves in the millions of single cells
which constitute us, we are told. And what we have to do
is to think of the separation between thing and thing in the
world as an illusion in the same sense as it is an illusion to
us that our personal consciousness does not hang together in
tfne whole but is made up of millions of discrete conscious-
nesses. Psychology teaches that individuality is not a simple,
single thing—its borders shift in a nebulous and indefinable
manner. We, each of us, are not one personality but many
personalities. Ail of us have our moods,—in which we are
' multiple personalities '. But, on the other hand, the per-
sonality which we do recognise as our one personality blends
so imperceptibly into and is so inextricably linked on to ' out-
side ' things (which nevertheless constitute it undoubtedly
by every infallible test) that when we try to bring ourselves
to book and determine exactly where an individual begins
and onds, we are baffled. 'Individuals' are influenced by
'things' and 'forces,' which influences undoubtedly go to
constitute them. The Volkerpsychologie of Wundt shows
that language and other institutions of fundamental import-
ance to constitute personality are social products. And
all this is no doubt due largely to community of memories
on which Butler insists. Von Hartmann worked out a
theory of Htils then, arresting in it points of contact with
experience, in which individuals are regarded as subject
indefinitely to purposive influences from without. On the
corporeal plane, parasites abound which constitute individ-
uality, inasmuch -as, for example, to drive men to the com-
mission of grave crimes. Biologically, as we have indicated,
individuals link on to each other through animal life and
plant life and inorganic life. It is a question even for the
scientists whether a true line can be drawn between the plant
and the inorganic world—through crystallisation, for ex-
ample. Certainly minerals are transmuted into living sub-
stance, and scientific opinionl may fairly be said to hold that
the inorganic must be thought of as in some way or other
alive. But it is a logical certainty that if the inorganic were
not essentially akin to the organic, it would be impossible to
connect them as orthodox science holds they are connected.
1
 e.g. Professor Schitfer's Presidential Address to the British Associa-
tion, 1912 ; Loeb, etc.
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It is only short-coming in thinking that makes people ob-
livious to the fact that " matter " itself must be regarded as
essentially alive. In other words the logical choice is only
between a dead Universe and a living Universe : a Universe
which is pretended to be dead-and-alive, in this sense, will be
spued out of the mouth of true thinking. So our argument
ends in this, that life extends—through heredity in time past
and de facto in time present—over the whole Universe, em-
bracing all ultimately in its one power. The unconsciousness
of the world is no proof of its Tbeing dead—on the contrary,
it may, as we have seen, be a proof of its being very much
alive. Where individuals begin and end is like a current
in the sea—they join, but precisely where, no man can de-
termine.
Prof. Ward, in his recent Gifford lectures, supports the
view we have put forward, so far as he goes, in almost daring
and revolutionary fashion. He resolves the world into an
assemblage of subjective centres of feeling and striving. The
objective world is simply the appearance of these monads to
one another, and its fixed laws and stable arrangements have
in reality been gradually evolved as a result of the behaviour
of these individuals to one another in the struggle for the
best modus vivendi. Prof. Ward quotes Mr. C. S. Peirce, the
American philosopher: " Matter is effete mind, inveterate
habits becoming physical laws". Prof. Ward repeatedly
speaks of Nature as " plastic " in this sense, and adopts
natura naturans and natura naturata as doctrine expressing his
philosophy. " What is done, natura naturata—the decisions
made, the habits formed, the customs fixed—constitutes at
any stage the routine, the general trend of things, within
which future possibilities lie. What is still to do, natura
naturans, implies further spontaneity and growth : new deci-
sions to be taken, fresh experiments to be made." '
The view we have put forward shows that the whole of
Nature is ' designed,' although designed gradually by indi-
viduals of various sizes, largely short-sighted : but over all
a guiding purpose is clearly traceable, which, though ap-
parently cruel, in large degree, is yet largely beneficent.
In the objective world, God is life, and our view sees the
objective God vivifying and indwelling in all His creatures
—He in them and they in Him. It sees every part and
particle of the Universe as within the possible control of
God. If it makes the Universe the body of God, it makes
God the soul of the Universe. We may fairly ask with
Euripides,
1
 And Prof. Ward has taken up Hering :ind the ' memory ' doctrine.
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384 ROBERT F. RATTRAT:
Who knows if life be not death, and death, life ?
(Quoted in Gorgiat, 492.)
This is not our whole view of God, of course, it is only
the objective one. We must regard the objective world as
largely illusory, however real, but the subjective doctrine of
God Butler did not go into at length, though it is clearly
implied in his writings. We may just give a hint of it
now.
Everything has both an inside and an outside. We,
though composed, to our knowledge, of millions of indi-
vidual cells—and they, no doubt, have their individual
minds and individual worlds—have yet one inside and one
outside to our life. May we not imagine, with Fechner,
that we may ourselves be parts of a larger ' inside,' as we
are parts of a larger ' outside,' of a being—or beings ? No
matter what our theory of matter may be as to what matter
is, in every case we must always wait for the ultimate sub-
stance—"Vibration of whatt" we ask: " I n what does the
force or energy inhere?" So any 'theory of matter' can-
not tell us what ultimate matter is, except that it is vXtj,
substance capable of modification so as to be perceptible by
us. We have no substance. As Butler quoted—
We are such stuff
Aa dreams are made on.
Nevertheless we are forced by logic to posit substance
behind.
Anatole France's nut is the atom out of which has ap-
peared the Universe. The substance (in the metaphysical
sense) behind it is one and it is the same substance as we
have behind us. It is God. The disorganisation of the
atom into atoms and the reorganisation of atoms must
therefore be regarded as in some sense illusory; inasmuch
as the ' inside' unifies atoms apparently discrete. The
telescope makes the world smaller and the microscope
makes it larger, as Mr. Chesterton has pointed out, but
neither can reach the ultimate. It is indeed a fairy world,
expanding and contracting like a ' dissolving view' of a
magic lantern. The indwelling God, in the sense which
we have indicated, Butler believed he had proved. As the
Chinese saying has it, the inside constitutes the vessel. " In
Hini we live and move and have our being "—such expres-
sions of religion, the 139th Psalm, for example, are literally
true, on this view. We who hold this view see God, if you
will, in whatever we most delight in. We can express our
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love to Him and have it expressed to us in return, in the
caress bestowed on horse and dog, and kisses upon the lips
of those we love. We can say with Mr. Chesterton that a
chair is a kind of animal that allows us to sit on it, that the
fire is an elf that serves us. The stillness of life which men
say is not alive is like Aristotle's ' unmoved mover,' or the
' sleeping' top, or the Sleeping Beauty,1 for that matter, or
like the wheel that is going round so fast that it appears to
be still and no wheel. We now know from science that the
very stones speak of a limit of movement. All this is our
life that is hid in God. " A man varies his movements
because of failure or fatigue," says Mr. Chesterton, " but
if bis life and joy were gigantic, the very speed and ecstasy
of life would have the stillness of death." Our life rocks
between being and non-being, as Herachtus saw, but it
always comes to life. Our world is but the world of our
self-consciousness: it is but a drop in the bucket of our real
life: the rest is silence, for it is hid with Christ in God. The
Universe is alive ! and its soul is God.
1
 Nursery tales will be found to embody parables of Nature. Their
origin is mysterious and remotely old and they are often prophetio.
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